Abstract: From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the impact mechanism of the "de-middleization" reform in state-owned enterprises on financial performance. The study reveals that achieving organizational flattening by compressing management levels can effectively shorten the principal-agent chain and reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. The reform exerts its effects mainly through four pathways: de-intermediation of information channels, visualization of responsibility attribution, leanization of operating costs, and signaling of reform determination. These pathways directly lower the management expense ratio and indirectly improve asset operation efficiency, ultimately promoting the improvement of core financial indicators such as Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA).
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